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The £1bn bung won’t protect Northern Ireland from the pain of a hard
Brexit
The government has paid dearly for the support of the Democratic Unionist
Party. Anthony Costello looks at what Northern Ireland will get in exchange
for propping up the Conservatives. The irony is that £1bn in extra public
spending is unlikely to compensate for the effects of Brexit on a region which
is heavily dependent on agriculture and which has benefited greatly from EU
funds.
The dowry the Conservative party brought to its union with the Democratic Unionist Party was
exceptionally generous, totalling £1bn. Some, including myself, have wondered whether this
partnership could be a positive force, somewhat perversely paving the way for a soft/softer Brexit
– whatever that might mean in practice. But a closer reading of the document offers little to
suggest that the DUP can soften Theresa May’s stance.
A firm majority – 55.8% – of the Northern Irish electorate voted to Remain within the EU, with the
results crossing sectarian lines.  The result indicates that Northern Irish interests are paramount to
the electorate, and these interests are best served through the UK’s continued membership of the
EU. Access to the Single Market, as well as EU structural funds (such as the Common Agricultural
Policy) and the EU’s PEACE and INTEREG funds have served the region well on its path to
democratisation and autonomy.
The former Northern Ireland secretary and Leave supporter Theresa Villiers visits a beef farm in
Castleroe in 2013. Photo: Charles McQuillan/ Pacemaker / Northern Ireland Office via a CC BY
2.0 licence
Nationalist communities offered overwhelming support for the Remain camp. UK membership of
the EU facilitated the Northern Irish peace process and the establishment of the Good Friday
Agreement and has brought the nationalist communities economically, politically, socially and
culturally closer to their southern counterparts in the Republic. Severance of UK membership of
the EU, as well as the potential for a hard Brexit has led to much concern about the future
economic and political stability of Northern Ireland – a region much less economically viable
than some of its regional counterparts in Britain. The reinstatement of the border between
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Northern and the Republic of Ireland will have significant consequences for Northern Irish border
county trade and employment.
For some, the £1bn deal has provided a very welcome injection of cash into the Northern Irish
economy and boosted economic confidence amongst the electorate. For others, it represents a
short-term pay-off which subjugates any potential that Northern Ireland had to influence the Brexit
negotiations. Some regard the deal positively as a force for Unionist empowerment in the North.
Many others fear that such political leverage will negatively affect the democratic quality of
governance in the region. Most contentious is the issue of impartiality in the Good Friday
Agreement. Conservative ‘union-ship’ with the DUP has put to the question whether the UK
government has violated the terms of impartiality, and if so, how detrimental to the Northern Irish
peace process this arrangement may be.
The DUP alliance does have the potential to lead the way to a softer Brexit, providing that
pragmatism – as opposed to ideology – determines the party’s Brexit-based goals, mediated
through its new-found influence. However, knowing what we know about the DUP as an
ideological force combined with their intense loyalty to the concept of a sovereign United Kingdom
– as well as their Eurosceptic sentiments – the sheer financial value of the deal should lead us to
ask some pressing questions.
Most of the terms of the agreement are typical of ‘confidence and supply’ deals. The DUP has
promised to abstain on motions of no confidence and on finance, budget and general money bills,
as well as some mutual agreements on matters such as the pensions triple lock, winter fuel
payments and NATO. However, the striking aspects of the document pertain to the language
surrounding the DUP’s support regarding Brexit negotiations, as well as the Conservative Party’s
support for Northern Ireland’s agricultural sector. For example, the DUP commits to ‘‘support the
government on legislation pertaining to the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU’’ and ‘‘legislation
pertaining to national security’’.  Although vague, this suggests that the Conservative party will
remain the true drivers of the Brexit negotiations and the values of the Conservative party
regarding the issue will be supported by their partners.
Another striking feature of the agreement are references to Northern Ireland’s agricultural industry.
‘‘Agriculture will be a critical policy area during the EU exit negotiations’’ – and the Conservative
party will provide a framework for future farming support after the end of the parliament. There
is potential for a soft (or softer) Brexit if the Conservatives take into account the unique conditions
of Northern Ireland’s agricultural sector in EU talks. A hard Brexit will probably mean the
introduction of trade tariffs, as well as the loss of essential CAP funding. That could affect prices,
production levels and employment rates. It is not clear if the UK would step in so as to drive down
price inflation and stabilise production. However, if it does, taxes will have to rise as a result.
The Irish Republic is Northern Ireland’s main export partner in the agri-food sector. Inflation, tariffs
and a loss of funding will affect cross-border trade (particularly in the border counties), as it could
become too costly to trade with Northern Ireland outside the Single Market or customs union.
Without this trade with the South the prospects for Northern Ireland’s economy look bleak.
Promises to help agriculture, as well as the pledges to boost health funding (including mental
health) and the services sector are effectively insurance policies against economic crisis. They
may be a stop-gap in lieu of EU funding, and indicative of a plan to protect the region against the
effects of a hard Brexit.
The document did not even mention the matter of the Northern Irish border – yet it ought to be a
crucial issue for Northern Ireland due to the economic, political and social factors at stake. Since
it represents a solidifying inter-party relationship intended to re-establish the Conservative Party’s
mandate for Brexit, one would expect more clarity on the issue. The blasé approach to leaving the
EU is somewhat disconcerting.
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Most alarmingly, the high price of the deal – an extortionate £1bn – is odd considering the
Conservatives are gaining the support of just 13 extra MPs on general legislation, amid a few
specific policy issues. Behind the deal’s vague assurances, it seems plausible that the DUP have
pledged their support for a hard Brexit.
The irony is that £1bn will certainly not cover the long-term economic effects of a hard Brexit in the
region. One can only hope that the payment will not serve to undermine Northern Ireland’s true
interests in what will undoubtedly be long and tense negotiations.
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